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The Constitution doesn't guarantee Americans the right to vote. That always comes
as a surprise to non-lawyers. But you will search the Constitution in vain for any such
guarantee, as the Justices of the Supreme Court cheerily reminded us in Bush v.
Gore.' What the Constitution contains is a series of thou shalt nots. Thou shalt not
deny the right to vote on account of race2 or sex.3 Thou shalt not impose poll taxes.'
Thou shalt not prevent eighteen-year-olds from voting.'
It's difficult to develop a robust case law when you only know what you can't
do. For this reason, several academics and reformers have proposed amending the
Constitution to include a right to vote. They argue that a constitutional amendment
would produce any number of progressive goodies, including an end to partisan gerry-
mandering, strict policing of burdens placed on the right to vote, and an expansion
of the franchise.6
Count me as skeptical. As the Doubting Thomasina in this symposium,' I should
emphasize that I would be delighted if a robust right to vote were already enshrined
in the Constitution. I would be just as delighted if I possessed a magic wand and could
put one there. But in a world without either a textual guarantee or a ready cache of
magic wands, I have substantial doubts as to whether the amendment game is worth
the candle. It is unlikely that an amendment would achieve what reformers have prom-
ised it will achieve. Indeed, even when one looses one's imagination on the broader
possibilities associated with amendment, it is hard to imagine we could reap benefits
* J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law at Yale University. I would like to thank the partici-
pants in the Rethinking D.C. Representation in Congress conference for helpful comments.
Excellent research assistance was provided by Emily Barnet, Daniel Rauch, and Meng Jia
Yang. This argument was first offered in a short post in Slate. Some of what follows draws
from that post.
' See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
6 See infra notes 31-35, 58 and accompanying text.
There is, however, a Doubting Thomas. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Three Questions
for the "Right to Vote "Amendment, 23 WM. & MARY BLL RTs. J. 27,28 (2014). It's always
a relief to be on the same side of an issue as Richard Briffault, as he is one of the wisest and
most sensible members in our field. Our papers were written independently, but there are deep
continuities in our analyses.
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substantial enough to outweigh the extraordinary costs associated with a successful
amendment campaign. The organizational muscle and resources to push for reform are
in short supply, and it would be better for those limited resources to focus on reforms
that are more discrete but easier to achieve.
Part I explains why I'm skeptical that a right to vote will produce enough change
in the system to justify the costs involved, especially when compared to the more con-
ventional and less costly alternatives for effecting change. If an amendment enshrining
the right to vote looks anything like its cognates in the Constitution, it will be thinly
described, maddeningly vague, and pushed forward by self-interested politicians. At
the very least, it's unlikely to persuade judges to mandate large-scale reform. Judges
are conservative creatures, at least in the Burkean sense. They are typically loathe to
upend a system based on a vague textual guarantee. And a vague textual guarantee is
as good as it's likely to get. Nor is it likely to matter if the amendment gives Congress
more room to maneuver given that body's unwillingness to do much with the power
it already possesses.
Part 1I attempts to break out of a cautious law professor mold and find "scope
for imagination," to quote Anne Shirley.' If we look past the traditional rationales for
amendment, one can imagine at least two other benefits that might come from an ef-
fort to amend. The first is that a robust social movement might alter the way that all
Americans, including judges, think about the right to vote. If that's the case, things
will change for the better, and it won't much matter what the text of the amendment
says-it might not even matter if the text of the Constitution is altered in the end. The
second is the possibility that amending the Constitution might help lend some coher-
ence to judicial doctrine in the elections arena by providing judges tools they sorely
lack in election law. The first offers a substantial payoff but depends on steep odds;
the second seems likely to follow from amendment but represents a modest benefit
when weighed against the costs of the amending process.
I. PROMISES, PROMISES, PROMISES
A. The Costs of the Amendment Process
Before describing the benefits of constitutional amendment, it's worth briefly
making a pedantic point. Amending the Constitution is a heavy lift. Even setting aside
the challenges involved in getting Congress to do anything, let alone getting the requi-
site two-thirds vote to initiate the amendment process, there is the pesky challenge
involved in getting three-quarters of the states to ratify it.'o
8 For an exploration of the relationship between Burke and judging, see Ernest A. Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation,
72 N.C. L. REv. 619, 642-86 (1994).
9 L. M. MONTGOMERY, ANNE OF GREEN GABLEs 32-33 (Courage Books 1993) (1908).
10 U.S. CONsT. art. V.
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That task looks even more daunting when one acknowledges why reformers are
seeking an amendment. For years reformers have tried to pass election reform through
state legislatures and Congress, encountering one roadblock after another. These are,
of course, the same state legislatures and the same Congress that must agree to amend
the Constitution. This might lead you to think that talk of amendment is merely empty
rhetoric. The usual reaction to roadblocks, after all, is not to attempt a moonshot. But
reformers have a much more serious plan. They think--correctly, I suspect-that the
right to vote is easier to organize around than piecemeal reform and hope that large-
scale organizing will cause the usual roadblocks to fall." Nonetheless, the basic point
still stands. State legislatures and Congress are formidable barriers to reform no matter
what the scale.
Everyone knows this, of course, most especially reformers. But we all have a bad
tendency to ignore what I have described elsewhere as the "here to there" problem. 2
There's a good deal of agreement about what's wrong with our election system-the
"here"-and we've got lots of ideas about to how to fix it-the "there". But academics,
at least, have a bad habit of announcing their solutions as if we could just add water
and produce them. When evaluating the costs and benefits of a given reform proposal,
it's all too easy to think only of the costs associated with implementation, not those
associated with passage. If we are going to evaluate whether the amendment game
is worth the candle, however, we must think about the resources involved in getting
the amendment passed in the first place and assess whether those resources might be
better directed elsewhere.
When one focuses on the "here to there" question, it's hard to see why we should
put our muscle behind amending the Constitution. If the benefits associated with
amendment were substantial, perhaps I'd think differently. But they are not. As I ex-
plain in the next section, an amendment isn't likely to get us much more than we're
already getting from the courts and Congress.
B. The Benefits ofAmendment
To see why the benefits of amending are not as substantial as many think, keep
in mind that there are, in fact, two stages to the amendment process. Stage 1 involves
passing it. Stage 2 involves making good on its promise, either by enforcing its guar-
antees through the courts or by prodding Congress to use whatever enforcement power
it's been given to pass legislation. 3 Given the realities associated with Stage 1, my
" For one such assessment, see ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, IN PURSUT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE
RIGHT TO VOTE: STRATEGIC REPORT JULY 2008 7-8 (2008), available at http://b.3cdn.net
/advancement/ae94ee5ad8686f5760_27m6vr0j7.pdf.
12 HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM Is FAILING
AND How To Fix IT 6-8 (2010) [hereinafter GERKEN, DEMOCRACY INDEX].
" Cf Joshua Field, Creating a Federal Right to Vote, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (June 25,
2013), available athttp://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/FieldVoting
Rights.pdf (acknowledging that "even if a constitutional amendment were to pass, it would
not be an instant fix" because reformers would have to enforce the right through litigation).
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assumption is that the right to vote will be thinly described, which means that almost
every benefit associated with the amendment will still have to come from the courts
or Congress in Stage 2. Even if these institutions were newly empowered or newly
chastened by the passage of an amendment, neither is likely to be forthcoming on
this front.
In order to unpack this argument, think about how Stage 1-the amending
process-is likely to unfold. The right to vote has generic support among Americans,
but that's plainly not enough to guarantee passage. If shallow popular support were all
we needed, we would have had an amendment a long time ago. But the amendment
process requires reformers to move from polling to the polls. And that move, in turn,
requires organizational muscle, financial support, and boots on the ground.
The moment one thinks about how much organizing and politicking will be neces-
sary to pass the right to vote is the moment one wonders what role political elites will
play in the process. The reason we need a right to vote in the first place, of course,
is because the foxes are guarding the henhouse. The people who know the most about
reform and care the most about reform are the political incumbents who mostly oppose
reform. Reform generally gets passed, then, when it is in the interest of one party or
another, which often means that the resulting package isn't entitled to the honorific
"reform" in the first place. Indeed, it's precisely because reformers can't persuade
politicians to do the right thing that they are turning to the amendment process.
Perhaps a robust grassroots movement will emerge and the people will hold
elected officials' feet to the fire until the amendment process moves forward, though
I doubt it for reasons discussed below. 4 But the odds are that the amendment process
will require the backing of political elites, whose skill at framing issues and putting
them on the agenda has led one academic to call them "conversational entrepreneurs"
in national debates." At the very least, the amendment process will require the votes
of political elites.
So what will politicians votefor? They are most likely to vote for a thinly de-
scribed, upsettingly vague guarantee of the right to vote-that's presumably why
most of the concrete proposals take precisely this form.'6 I assume, then, that a viable
amendment will include two things. The first is a guarantee of the right, enforceable
by the courts. The second is a clause granting Congress discretion to enforce the right
as well-the equivalent of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"4 See discussion infra Part II.
' ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37,
168 n.6 (2003).
16 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 28, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://archive.fairvote.org
/?page=214; Jamin B. Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore and Why WeNeedto Amend
the Constitution to Ensure it Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652,694 (2002) [herein-
after Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore]; Press Release, Rep. Mark Pocan, Pocan and
Ellison Announce Right to Vote Amendment (May 13, 2013), available at http://pocan.house
.gov/media-center/press-releases/pocan-and-ellison-announce-right-to-vote-amendment.
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If the amendment takes this form, the benefits reformers and academics assert
we'll reap are anything but automatic. Once a vague guarantee is embedded in the
Constitution (Stage 1), reformers will still have to turn to legislators and courts to get
something done (Stage 2). That's why supporters of amendment face an excruciating
tactical dilemma in passing the amendment. The vaguer the text, the more likely it is
to pass, but the more work there will be to do post-amendment. Making the text more
concrete may make Stage 2 easier, but it will complicate efforts to pass the amend-
ment in the first place. After all, if it were easy to enfranchise former felons or to block
voter ID rules or to guarantee a well-administered election system or to end partisan
gerrymandering, we would presumably have done it already.
It's possible, of course, that reformers could aim for something more than vague
language, either by writing their aims explicitly into the text or creating an amendment
history so robust that everyone understands what the right embodies. On this view,
reformers would build a big tent of supporters by linking the amendment to lots of
different reforms."
The problem with this strategy is that it will also generate a big tent on the other
side. Push for felon enfranchisement, and you'll run up against the tough-on-crime
lobby. Tempt progressives with a ban on voter ID and lose the support of many
Republicans. Promise to end gerrymandering and lose the support of most incum-
bents. That's why a vague textual guarantee is so tempting an option in Stage 1 even
if it creates more work for Stage 2.18
Assuming the right to vote takes the form I suggest, it will open up-or more pre-
cisely, expand-two avenues for change: litigation and legislation. While proponents
are not always clear about whether they think the courts or Congress will be our source
of solace, I've grouped them in what I think are roughly the correct categories.
1. The Litigation Path
As noted above, because the foxes are guarding the henhouse, we often look to
the courts to cure what ails our democracy.9 But courts have offered a fairly tepid
17 See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that "pro-democracy
forces" working on registration requirements and felon disenfranchisement could be united
and suggesting that "civil rights groups seeking stronger protection from discriminatory
practices could join with other progressives who are seeking tamper-free voting machines");
Jamin Raskin, Democratic Capital: A Voting Rights Surge in Washington Could Strengthen
the Constitution for Everyone, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 47, 58-59 (2014) [hereinafter
Raskin, Democratic Capital] (offering a sample constitutional amendment that he believes will
extend the vote to D.C. and the territories, roll back the Supreme Court's campaign-finance
jurisprudence, and protect minor parties). Briffault is skeptical about at least one of Raskin's
claims. Briffault, supra note 7, at 38 (questioning whether Raskin's proposed amendment
will aid minor parties).
18 Richard Briffault raises a similar worry, though he frames it differently. See Briffault,
supra note 7, at 36, 41.
' See supra Part I.B.
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response to reformers' demands for change. With the exception of one person, one
vote, where the Court fundamentally altered the political landscape with its rulings,
the Court has done as much to resist change as to facilitate it.
An amendment would change all of that, we are told, because it would force the
Court to treat the right to vote as fundamental and thus subject to strict scrutiny. 20
Were the Court to apply a rigorous form of strict scrutiny to voting cases, the doc-
trine would shift in important ways. Reformers suggest, for instance, that courts would
strike down voter ID laws, invalidate laws disenfranchising ex-felons, rule that the
administrative burdens on voting constitute de facto disenfranchisement, and perhaps
even strike down partisan gerrymanders.2 1
Those claims strike me as painfully optimistic. The Court has repeatedly termed
the right to vote "fundamental" and insisted that it is entitled to rigorous protection.22
Even those cases that do not term the right "fundamental" laud its deep importance.23
But the Court has not subjected all burdens on the right to vote to a rigorous form of
strict scrutiny.24 And even if the Court felt that strict scrutiny had to be applied in every
voting case in the wake of an amendment, strict scrutiny's application would not be
fatal in fact. To the contrary, the Court would have every temptation to be almost as
passive as it is now. Either the Court would deploy a looser means/ends scrutiny than
it deploys in the equality context or it would take an expansive view of what consti-
tutes a compelling state interest.
Take the first category of goodies that progressives insist will result from an
amendment-those having to do with the administrative dimensions of voting, such
as voter ID and the other bureaucratic burdens placed, deliberately or incidentally, on
the right to vote.25 Contrary to the suggestions of those who favor amendment, the
20 See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 5, 11-12.
21 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,342 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 112
(1970); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Harper v. Va.
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62,
581 (1964).
23 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,433 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 786-88 (1983); William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
24 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428; Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. ofElections, 360 U.S.
45 (1959); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Elections Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008). Richard
Briffault's paper offers a helpful survey of the ways in which the Court's doctrine has become
less protective of the right to vote rather than more during the last few decades. Briffault,
supra note 7, at 30-31.
25 Supporters of amendment routinely invoke these problems when making the case for
a right to vote. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 3-6, 11; Field, supra note
13, at 3-4; Jamin B. Raskin,A Right-to- VoteAmendmentfor the US. Constitution: Confronting
America 's Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559,560,562-63 (2004) [hereinafter
Raskin, A Right-to- Vote Amendment]; Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore, supra note
16, at 695.
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Court cannot realistically subject every administrative decision burdening the fran-
chise to strict scrutiny. Some administrative rules are clearly being manipulated to
make it harder for one group or another to vote.26 But almost every administrative de-
cision ends up helping some voters and harming others, if only because every admin-
istrative decision allocates scarce resources to one place and away from another.27
Given this stubborn bureaucratic fact, the Court will be forced to do what it does in
any other administrative context-balance the interests of the state against the interests
of voters.28 in such a context, it's unrealistic to think that the Court will apply a robust
form of strict scrutiny. When the Court applies strict scrutiny in the race context, it
does so because it is highly skeptical of the state's motives. In the context of election
administration, however, there will almost always be serious interests on the state's
side, even if they are merely conventional bureaucratic interests. As the Court noted
in Burdick v. Takushi:
[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require
that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest . .. would tie the hands of States seeking to assure
that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. Accordingly,
the mere fact that a State's system "creates barriers ... tending to
limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose ...
does not of itself compel close scrutiny." 29
Balancing, then, will be the courts' modus operandi after amendment, just as it is now.
That's not to say that you can't eke out wins from the courts. To the contrary, the
recent spate ofjudicial rulings invalidating voter ID schemes confirms this. But note
that those wins didn't come from the sudden introduction of a robust right to vote into
our Constitution or even an important change in the law. As best we can tell, those
victories were won by smart litigating and smart politicking. Inside the courtroom,
26 One need not look past partisan gerrymandering for proof, but ex-
amples abound in election administration as well. Perhaps the most egre-
gious example occurred when Ohio's then-Secretary of State, Kenneth
Blackwell, insisted that voter registration applications be printed on 80-
pound card stock (the type of paper used for wedding invitations). There
could be no other justification for this rule save partisan manipulation.
GERKEN, DEMOCRACY INDEX, supra note 12, at 17.
27 Richard Briffault raises another challenging wrinkle: the role state and local adminis-
trators play in running elections, something that raises additional hurdles to vindicating a robust
right to vote. Briffault, supra note 7, at 36-37.
28 While the Justices often debate precisely how to strike that balance-as is made clear
from the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Crawfordv. Marion County Election
Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)-no one seriously disputes the necessity of a balancing test in
this context.
29 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433-34 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972))
(citations omitted).
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advocates offered more and better evidence than was offered in Crawford. Outside the
courtroom, advocates worked to reframe voter ID as a partisan fight rather than a fight
over fraud, thereby pushing judges to evaluate the state's proffered interests with more
skepticism. What moved judges, then, was better evidence and better public relations,
not better text or better precedent. Both can be attained with targeted campaigns rather
than a giant grassroots movement to enshrine the right to vote in the Constitution.
Moreover, to the extent that much disenfranchisement stems from benign neglect-
a lack of professionalism, a lack of resources-rather than nefarious discrimination, 0
even robust judicial review is unlikely to be of much help. Judges are not well suited
to deal with large-scale institutional problems of this sort, as they can't put election
systems into receivership. These are bureaucratic problems, and they require bureau-
cratic solutions. We often think that voting reform comes from outside of the election
system-from rules imposed by legislators or oversight imposed by reformers. But the
most important levers of change are often election administrators themselves. If elec-
tion administrators have a strong set of professional norms, agreed-upon best practices,
and the technical capacity and resources to anticipate and fix problems in advance,
there will be a lot less for legislators and reform groups to do. If you want to spend
your resources on reform, it's better to focus on improving the state of election admin-
istration than on igniting a large-scale social movement.
Reformers believe that an amendment will not only mitigate burdens on the ex-
ercise of the franchise, but also lift restrictions on who may exercise the franchise in
the first place.3' A robust right to vote, we are told, will ensure that many people who
cannot cast a ballot for a congressional representative today will be able to do so in
the future, including felons,32 noncitizens,33 residents of Puerto Rico and other U.S.
territories, 34 and-most relevant to this symposium-residents of D.C.3 1
As to the last two groups, a generic right to vote isn't going to help. The reason
that residents of D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, et al. can't vote has to do with something
already in the Constitution's text: the word state.3 ' Rightly or wrongly, most read the
30 See generally GERKEN, DEMOCRACY INDEX, supra note 12.
3' See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 11.
32 See id. at 14 ("The goal of any movement should push further by expanding the fran-
chise to persons who are incarcerated or serving sentences. . . ."); Raskin, A Right-to- Vote
Amendment, supra note 25, at 564; Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore, supra note 16,
at 695.
1 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 12-13.
34 See id. at 17; Raskin, A Right-to- Vote Amendment, supra note 25, at 565-66; Raskin,
What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore, supra note 16, at 695.
3 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 16-17; Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush
v. Gore, supra note 16, at 695.
36 Reformers, much to their credit, explicitly acknowledge this fact and note that either
a "maximalist" amendment, to use the Advancement Project's term, or a second amendment
would be necessary to achieve this goal. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 14, 16-17.
" For a discussion ofthis constitutional question, see Raskin, Democratic Capital, supra
note 17, at 51-52.
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text to preclude U.S. citizens residing in D.C. or the territories from voting for mem-
bers of Congress. A generic amendment wouldn't fix that problem.
Nor is it clear that these two groups are well served by tying their fates to a
generic right-to-vote campaign in the hope of passing two amendments rather than
one. Much depends on whether you think, like most political scientists, that discrete
and concentrated interests do better in politics than broad, diffuse interests." More-
over, it is not clear that a stirring campaign on the right to vote is going to lend greater
moral weight to the claims of U.S. citizens in the territories or D.C. Take the DC Vote
movement for example.39 The claims of D.C. voters already have a great deal of moral
weight; they are United States citizens deprived of representation simply because they
live in the nation's capital. What's stopping D.C. residents from voting at this point
is a political calculus, not a moral one.40
As to other groups-felons and noncitizens-it's just as hard to imagine a generic
amendment changing the Court's view on whether these groups may be properly ex-
cluded from voting.4' There are serious arguments for greater inclusion. But until the
Court changes its views on ex-felons and noncitizens, these categories will be intuitive
enough for the Justices to think that states should have discretion to exclude these
two groups from the ballot. Judges already believe that the right to vote is important.
If you want judges to invalidate restrictions on ex-felons' voting, you need to change
their mind about ex-felons. If you want judges to invalidate restrictions on noncitizen
voting, you need to change their minds about noncitizens. Here again, a campaign
lauding a generic right to vote seems like an indirect method for addressing the real
source ofjudges' hesitation to do what reformers want them to do.
Finally, some think that a right to vote will push the courts to end partisan gerry-
mandering.4 2 Here again, the solution is pretty indirect. The source of the Court's hesi-
tation to regulate partisan gerrymanders isn't the absence of a textual guarantee; it's
the absence of a manageable standard. Even in the days when the Court believed it
38 For an important assessment of this work and its relationship to constitutional theory,
see Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985).
39 About DC Vote, DCVOTE, https://www.dcvote.org/about-dc-vote (last visited Oct. 23,
2014) (describing the movement's efforts to secure voting representation in Congress for U.S.
citizens in the District of Columbia).
40 Many believe, probably correctly, that D.C. is likely to elect two Democrats to the Senate
and one to the House-something that might well affect the balance of power between the
parties. A desire to maintain balance ofpolitical power is largely why, as Jamin Raskin notes in
his contribution to this symposium, "Most states have entered the Union as part of a bipartisan
and sectional deal, roughly in pairs, like animals boarding Noah's ark." Raskin, Democratic
Capital, supra note 17, at 49.
4' Richard Briffault is of the same view. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 42-43.
42 See Field, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that a "constitutionally guaranteed right to vote"
would put "an end to gerrymandering of legislative and congressional districts"). Jamie Raskin
also suggests that the amendment and the movement behind it will mitigate discrimination
against third parties and independents. Raskin, A Right-to- Vote Amendment, supra note 25,
at 570-72; Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore, supra note 16, at 695.
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was constitutionally authorized to regulate partisan gerrymanders, it gave us nothing
but a watered-down, majoritarian standard that was all but impossible to satisfy in
practice.4 3 The Court has been reluctant to go further, however, for prudential reasons.
As Justice Kennedy explained in his remarkably forthright concurrence in Vieth v.
Jubelirer," "[b]ecause there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness
in districting, we have no basis on which to define clear, manageable, and politically
neutral standards" for adjudicating such claims.45
As I've written elsewhere,46 the Court can't adjudicate partisan gerrymandering
claims unless it does what it has always been loathe to do, at least explicitly: choose
a theory of democracy. That's because any assessment of fairness in redistricting re-
quires a yardstick-an account of how much power ought to be accorded to members
of a group in a democracy. Here again, a generic right-to-vote campaign won't provide
the Court with that needed yardstick.
An amendment, then, seems unlikely to produce the cures for the problems that
reformers have identified. In each of the areas described above, the Court's reluc-
tance to provide robust protections for the right to vote have stemmed not from the
absence of a textual commitment, but from the concerns that will plague the courts
even after an amendment is in place. Judges worry about imposing their own concep-
tion of democracy on our democracy. They worry about leaving the state adequate
discretion to carry out its duties in administering elections. They have strongly held
intuitions about who should be included in our political community. Writing something
new into the Constitution will not erase those prudential considerations or eliminate
those human intuitions. The danger, then, as Richard Briffault pointed out at the sym-
posium, was that litigation in the wake of amendment will simply reproduce the same
problems that have always inhered in these cases.47
This is not to say that everything will remain the same. I presume that the Court
will be a little more skeptical of states' asserted interests, will scrutinize exclusionary
categories a little more closely, and will be a little bolder in thinking through partisan
gerrymandering. The question, though, is whether these changes will be enough to jus-
tify the substantial amount of time and effort needed to amend the Constitution, or
whether, as has already been done with voter ID, it is better to work on changing per-
ceptions issue-by-issue, category-by-category. I would not describe the amendment
43 See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124 (1986).
4 541 U.S. 267 (2003).
45 Id. at 307-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46 Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 503 (2004).
47 Richard Briffault, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, Remarks at the William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium: Privacy, Democracy, & Elections (Oct. 22, 2010).
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process as a blunderbuss to kill a flea. The game that reformers are stalking is big
game. But the right to vote may not be the right weapon for the fights reformers want
to have.
2. Goodies that Come from Congress
The courts are not the only source of solace for reformers if the Constitution is
amended, of course. As I note above, an amendment would almost certainly grant the
Congress the power to enforce the right, and some think that such a provision will do
much to improve our democracy."8
Here again, I have my doubts. Even setting aside City ofBoerne v. Flores,49 which
has placed important limits on Congress's enforcement powers,"o there is little evi-
dence that Congress's passivity in this arena stems from a concern about a lack of con-
stitutional authority. At the very least, Congress enjoys substantial authority to regulate
federal elections," which means that Congress enjoys de facto authority to regulate
state elections, since states can't afford to run parallel processes. Moreover, states are
absolutely starved for funds to run their elections, something that gives Congress sub-
stantial leverage under the Spending Clause.52 Despite this fact, we've seen precious
little from Congress outside the civil-rights arena. Even Bush v. Gore-a fiasco of
suficient magnitude that it prompted Fidel Castro to offer to send election monitors
to Florida"--only prodded Congress to pass the toothless Help America Vote Act. 4
Congress's failure to regulate thus far stems from a lack of political will, not consti-
tutional power. And here again, it seems likely that targeted mobilization efforts will
achieve more reform than a diffuse campaign to push for a generic right to vote.
II. WHAT IF...
To evaluate the best case for amendment, however, we have to acknowledge that
the courts' and Congress's failure to regulate occurs in this political environment. Per-
haps the amendment process itself would fundamentally alter the regulatory terrain,
48 See, e.g., Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment, supra note 25, at 563-64.
49 521 U.S. 507 (1996).
s Id. at 536. In the wake of Boerne, Congress can only enforce a right that the Court is
willing to recognize. While it can, to be sure, engage in remedial or prophylactic regulation,
enforcement powers will matter less in the future than they have in the past.
" Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Congressional Authority to Regulate Elections, in
NAT'L COMM'N ON ELECTION REFORM, To AsSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELEC-
TORAL PROCESS 235, 235 (2002).
52 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
" Richard Lacayo, In the Eye of the Storm, TIME (Nov. 20, 2000), http://content.time
.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047379,00.html.
5 Help America Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1673 (2002) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15485 (2002)).
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either by changing how we, as a society, think about the right to vote-something
that should affect both the courts and Congress-or by giving courts better tools with
which to decide election cases.
As to the first, a robust social movement in favor of amendment would obviously
matter. Indeed, it might matter even if the movement doesn't ultimately succeed
in amending the text of the Constitution. Reva Siegel's important work on the Equal
Rights Amendment suggests that even though the amendment itself failed, the move-
ment behind it succeeded in changing the minds of the American people, including
American judges." As a result, judges were willing to move a fair way toward gender
equality through case-by-case decisions even without the benefit of an amendment.
Think, too, about the social movement for gay rights and same-sex marriage today.
The Constitution's text hasn't changed, but the law has.
My worry is that a right-to-vote movement isn't the kind of movement likely to
induce a sea of change in American politics. The politics of (mis)recognition fueled
the social movements described above. In each instance, a group demanded equality,
and the law eventually began to cede it to them. The right to vote certainly resonates
for such movements, as Judith ShkIar's evocative work makes clear." People fought
and died for the Voting Rights Act, and with good reason. But that movement was part
of a larger movement for equality, not just a movement for the right to vote.
The trouble with a push for a right to vote today is that most Americans already
possess it. In the 1960s, denying the vote to African-Americans was part and parcel
of denying their standing in American society. Some forms of disenfranchisement-
notably, restrictions on voting by ex-felons and noncitizens-take a similar form in
the eyes of many. But reformers' "patchwork of grievances"" includes many harms
that are more diffuse and less personal. You may think it's outrageous that legislators
draw their own districts or that burdensome registration requirements make it harder
for many to vote or that someone asks for your ID at the polls, but it's often hard to
claim that those regulations are aimed at reducing your standing in society. And when
such a claim can be made, we see people energized and ready to fight the good fight.
Moreover, for most Americans, the problems with our election system seem one
step removed from their everyday concerns, like the economy or health care or the edu-
cation of their kids. And while I believe fervently that process shapes substance-that
" That's why Jamie Raskin, one of the right-to-vote amendment's most ardent and able
defenders, is careful to base his claims on both "the amendment and the movement behind it."
Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore, supra note 16, at 695; see also Raskin, Democratic
Capital, supra note 17, at 59-61. For a description of what such a movement might look like,
see ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 18-20.
5 Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the defacto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1323, 1323-24 (2006).
1 See generally JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION
(1991).
8 I borrow the term from Jamie Raskin. Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore, supra
note 16, at 695.
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our political structures shape policy outcomes-I'm well aware of how hard it is to
make that point to people who aren't immersed in this area. Second-order reform is
simply harder than first-order reform.
Again, none of this is meant to suggest that a grass-roots movement is doomed
to fail. But at the very least, it will encounter the same organizational challenges that
reformers in other areas encounter when they want to fix harms that seem abstract or
fall diffusely on the American people. Ask environmental reformers how tough it's
been to get climate change legislation through Congress. Ask human-rights advocates
how hard it's been to push the United States to join international treaties.
Moreover, even if there were enough grass roots energy behind a generic right
to vote to get an amendment passed, I wonder whether that energy will extend to the
full "patchwork of grievances" that animate reformers' efforts on this front. I noted
above that if you want judges to strike down restrictions on voting by ex-felons or
noncitizens, you have to change their minds about ex-felons and noncitizens, not
about the right to vote. The same may be true of everyday Americans. Believing more
strongly in the importance of the vote won't necessarily translate into a push to ex-
tend the right to other groups. It's quite possible that more targeted campaigns might
better serve these groups. So, too, it may be that these issues will get resolved not
when they are folded into a broader discussion about the right to vote, but when they
are folded into a broader discussion about criminal justice or immigration. In either
case, in a world with limited resources, it's not clear that people who care about these
issues would be wise to spend their political capital on amending the Constitution.
I can think of one other reason to enshrine the right to vote in the Constitution, but
this has more to do with the health of the courts than with the health of our democracy.
While I'm skeptical that an amendment would result in the many goodies that reform-
ers have promised, I do think an amendment would do something-it would help the
courts do a betterjob of doing what they are doing now. 9 For better or for worse-and
probably for worse-the courts have become the de facto referees of election disputes.
It's the Star Wars problem. Like Obi-Wan Kenobi, they are our only hope-the only
ones, outside of self-interested politicians, who can step in. But while courts inevitably
must resolve these cases, they lack the tools to do so. Just take a look at one of the
Court's most revered lines of cases-the one person, one vote doctrine. The early
cases are largely unmoored from conventional legal analysis. I sometimes joke with
my students that the only law in these cases is in the dissents.
That's not surprising given the contents of judges' doctrinal toolboxes. In de-
ciding constitutional cases, judges typically look to the text, history, doctrine, and
the structure of the Constitution to guide their decisions. Those tools aren't generally
" Jamie Raskin does not develop the point in this fashion, but he at least insists that a
textual commitment would have prevented, or at least mitigated, what he considers to be the
fiasco of Bush v. Gore. Raskin, What's Wrong with Bush v. Gore, supra note 16, at 679
("[T]he constitutional language [on which the Court relied was] so pliable that the Bush
majority could arrive at the astonishing resolution [that it did.]").
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available to judges in elections cases. We don't have much in terms of constitutional
text save a series of thou shalt not amendments-the Constitution does not even men-
tion political parties, the engines of any democratic system. Our history, needless to
say, is sullied by a pattern of exclusion. There's not a lot of doctrine yet developed.
And constitutional structure is also of little help; it does not even tell us who is sup-
posed to decide certain basic questions about our democracy, let alone how they should
decide them. It's hard to adhere to the dictates of legal craft when the basic tools of the
trade are unavailable. Little wonder, then, that in reading these cases, one sometimes
has the feeling that the judges are winging it.
If there's a time when it is important for courts to pay attention to craft, it's when
they intervene in politics. The courts can't avoid making decisions that will change
political outcomes. When they do so, however, their opinions should measure up to
the highest standards. Bush v. Gore is just the most prominent example of what hap-
pens when judges offer a badly reasoned decision that aligns with their own political
preferences. But smaller examples abound. Elections cases-even cases within the
same doctrinal line-are rife with contradictions and poor reasoning.60
What the courts really need is what David Strauss brilliantly describes as "common
law constitutionalism."6 1 In many other areas of constitutional law, courts have begun
with a vague constitutional guarantee-the right to free speech, equal protection-
and gradually built up a long line of precedent. It doesn't constrain judges entirely,
far from it. But it does give their decisions shape and form. Over time, judicial wisdom
is layered onto a thin constitutional text. A well-developed case law, in short, helps
ensure that judges adhere to the dictates of craft.
For the doctrine to develop, though, we need a starting point, and we don't have
one. Without a right to vote enshrined in the Constitution, the courts inevitably look.
to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But these amendments capture only a part
ofwhat matters in voting. As I've written elsewhere, "[t]oo often courts witlessly apply
the case law without thinking about what makes elections distinctive."62 As a result,
the case law is a mess-unruly, incoherent, and often ad hoc. Adding a right to vote
to the Constitution wouldn't guarantee better elections, but it might well get us better
elections decisions. Whether or not this value is enough to justify all the organizing
and politicking necessary to amend the Constitution, at the very least there is a good
chance of a payoff.
60 For one set of examples, see Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes ofMinimalism
in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411, 1434-36 (2002).
61 David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877,
884-91 (1996). Strauss, of course, doesn't think common law constitutionalism depends on
a text. I'm not insisting here that a text is necessary. My point is simply that an amendment-
even a vaguely defined, under-specified amendment-would help jumpstart the process for
creating the common law constitutionalism that the Court requires to adjudicate election law
cases properly.
62 Heather Gerken, The Missing Right to Vote, SLATE (June 13, 2012, 10:48 PM), http://
hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/the-missing-right-to-vote.
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CONCLUSION
This Essay takes the position that one can favor a right-to-vote amendment with-
out favoring amending the Constitution to add a right to vote. It would be wonderful
if the Constitution included a robust right to vote. But given how few resources we
have to fight the good fight, I would rather see them directed toward discrete projects
with concrete payoffs. The costs of the amendment process are high, and most of the
promised benefits seem unlikely to accrue. Even when we look beyond the reformers'
wish lists, it's still hard to come up with a good reason to invest the resources necessary
to enshrine the right to vote in the Constitution. Targeted litigating and politicking seem
more likely to bring about the desired results than a full-fledged social movement. The
amendment process might produce a robust shift in how we view the right to vote,
and an amendment might produce a welcome improvement in the Court's doctrine.
The first involves a big payoff but steep odds; the second involves a small payoff
but reasonable odds. If you were in front of the political roulette wheel, is that where
you'd place your bet?
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